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Economics shocks buffeting the 
Wisconsin dairy industry are not unlike 
those afflicting agriculture for decades 
and even centuries. Agriculture 
historically has been beset more than 
most industries by shocks from nature, 
technology, and markets. Such shocks 
particularly from technology and 
markets have created winners and 
loosers. Farm winners have gone on to 
earn favorable returns on resources, 
create the most productive agriculture on 
earth, and provide a good life for 
operators and their families. Winners 
have provided the world with low cost, 
abundant food supplies of high quality 
and variety, and earned foreign exchange 
to pay for oil and other imports. 
Forces of technology and 
markets, unfortunately, also have left 
behind many hired farm workers, farm 
operators, and families. Some of those 
people have remained in farming while 
experiencing hardships; others have 
found better economic opportunities 
outside of farming. 
The process of structural change 
in American agriculture began with the 
commercialization of agriculture soon 
after the Jamestown colony was settled 
in Virginia in 1607. Colonists bought 
inputs and sold tobacco to "strangers" in 
England through markets farmers did not 
control or understand. As early as 1630, 
Virginia colonists attempted legislative 
price-fixing and acreage controls on 
tobacco in response to perceived unfairly 
low . prices (Taylor, p. 21 ). After 
voluntary controls failed, rioting 
Virginia tobacco growers engaged in 
plant-cutting and destruction of tobacco 
to raise prices. Thus began this nation's 
long history of farm discontent, 
occasionally violent protests, and 
p9pulist political movements (Taylor; 
Tweeten 1979, Ch.3). 
Despite protest movements, 
American farmers have not wavered in 
their commitment to private enterprise 
(Tweeten 1979, Ch. 3). When "good" 
markets failed, farmers were unwilling 
to accept that setbacks were the result of 
impersonal, normal forces of technology, 
supply, and demand. Rather, the failure 
of "good" markets and "good" farmers 
could only be the result of conspiracy by 
merchants, bankers, foreign 
governments, or "middlemen" extracting 
excessive profits. 
These farm protesters were not 
Marxist revolutionaries determined to 
overthrow democratic-capitalism or 
passive yoeman speculators who 
asserted that downside risks were 
inevitable "heat in the kitchen." Rather 
the pervasive alternative agriculture 
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culture has been populism-the 
philosophy that there is a simple, 
appealing, and wrong solution to every 
complex farm problem. 
The purpose of this paper is to 
review briefly structural changes 
underway today in American agriculture, 
their causes, and the public policies 
underlying change. I explore whether the 
current system is performing well, and 
how public policy might be improved to 
better serve producers and consumers. 
Before proceeding, I state some 
of my value judgments. I believe the 
main purpose of the political-economic 
system is to improve the well being of 
people. Economic development presents 
people with options from which they can 
choose to better their life. Development 
proceeds through economic efficiency 
(more output per unit of inputs of land, 
labor, and capital), equity ( providing 
distributive justice by access to 
schooling, a safety net of basic, social 
needs, etc.), and freedom of individuals 
to make decisions that improve their 
well being, as long as rights of others are 
respected. I feel these are best served by 
free enterprise in a democratic system 
where the public sector provides public 
good and corrects externalities so that 
markets work well. These issues are 
addressed in more detail later. 
Industrialization of Agriculture 
Major structural changes 
occurring particularly in the livestock 
industry today are commonly referred to 
as the industrialization of American 
agriculture. It refers to the application of 
modern manufacturing production, 
distribution, and coordination methods 
to the food chain (Boehlje, p. 30). 
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Distinctive features include movement to 
fewer, larger farms (of which some are 
"factory" farms), to vertical 
coordination, and to other departures 
from the traditional family farm where 
the operator and family provided over 
half the labor, management, and equity 
capital. 
Industrialization of dairy and 
other farming enterprises is caused 
mainly by changes in technology and 
organization underway for some 
decades. Previous highlights included 
the milking machine and the tractor and 
its complements replacing labor and 
bringing larger and fewer farms 
especially in the 1940s and 1950s, and 
d~sease control technology coupled with 
production contracts revolutionizing the 
poultry industry in the 1950s and the hog 
industry in the 1980s and 1990s.1 
Through it all, some farms have 
prospered while other farms have failed, 
but the general direction has been toward 
fewer and larger farms, increased 
productivity, lower real farm and food 
prices, greater assets and household 
income per farm, and greater dependence 
by farmers on off-farm inputs and jobs. 
A dual agriculture has emerged, with 
relatively few large farms accounting for 
most output and many small farms 
accounting for most farms. 
Vertical coordination (featuring 
integration of farm product marketing or 
1 Major upheavals in farming also have occurred 
from national economic shocks including the 
Great Depression of the 1930s and the farm 
financial crisis of the first half of the 1980s. In 
addition, farmers are buffeted by the shocks of 
drought causing crop failures as in 1934, 1936, 
1983, and 1988, by floods such as in 1993, and 
by a fickle international export market that failed 
in the 1930s, but prospered in the 1970s and late 
1990s. 
input supply with production agriculture 
through integrated ownership, 
production contracts, or marketing 
contracts) now accounts for over 40 
percent of farm output and is virtually 
complete in fruits, vegetables, poultry, 
and dairy (marketing orders). 
Production contracts are growing rapidly 
in hogs and today approximately one-
third of production is vertically 
coordinated. Vertical coordination, 
environmental regulations, and 
economics have shifted livestock 
production from the Midwest to the 
South where labor is cheaper, and to the 
Great Plains and Mountain states where 
open spaces and semi-arid climate 
minimize environmental problems and 
complaints. 
Forces of technology, 
international competition, the 
environment, and public policy continue 
to drive change in agriculture. Twenty-
first century commercial agriculture will 
be technologically advanced, large-scale, 
capital intensive, environmentally sound, 
scientifically based, internationally 
competitive, market driven (but 
government regulated), and managerially 
demanding. The challenges and rewards 
are breathtaking! Some large farms will 
be major businesses earning high rates of 
return. Operations of any size that fail to 
keep pace will not be treated kindly by 
markets. 
The outlook is for continuing 
change in a nation already fatigued by 
downsizing, outsourcing, mergers, spin-
offs, reengineering, restructuring, and 
reinventing. Is it any wonder that many 
farmers are asking for "time out?" Many 
want to stop or at least slow a world they 
feel is accelerating out of control in 
search of ever higher profits and living 
standards they feel too harried to enjoy. 
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Why Industrialization? 
Industrialization of agriculture is 
occurring because integrated ownership 
or production contracts often offer the 
opportunities for coordinated operation 
and controlled breeding and feeding 
useful to produce a standardized steady 
stream of the right quality of output at 
the right time at the right place at the 
right price. Larger operations can feature 
the scientific input, specialized 
resources, and low variable costs from 
production and marketing processes 
resembling those in nonfarm factories. 
Industrialization is occurring because 
larger farms are able to produce products 
d~sired by consumers at lower costs than 
can smaller farms. Of course, 
economies of size differ among 
enterprises and there is no one optimal 
size of farm. Nonetheless, cash grain 
farms typically require $200,000 in 
annual sales and dairy farms require 300 
or more cows to produce at lowest cost 
per unit. Cows on many dairies in 
California number in the thousands, and 
a few Midwest dairies are aiming for like 
numbers. While unit cost curves rarely 
turn up (to indicate rising cost per unit of 
output as size increases), some farms can 
be too large to manage efficiently. A 
well-managed large farm will out-
compete a well managed medium-size 
farm. But a well-managed medium-size 
farm can out-compete a poorly managed 
large farm. 
Some large farms access public 
capital markets and disperse ownership 
to avoid intergeneration financing and 
cash-flow problems plaguing traditional 
family farms. In short, the above features 
including the ability to spread high fixed 
costs from "lumpy" inputs over many 
units of output enable large farms to 
produce at lower total cost per unit of 
output than smaller farms. 
Industrial farms also have 
disadvantages. Many Americans find 
confinement livestock systems 
objectionable as a matter of principle. 
Odors, flies, and waste disposal are 
frequently problematic on large farms. 
Costs of bringing in forage and moving 
waste out of a 3,000 cow dairy operation 
are staggering. Costs are high for large 
farms to spread waste widely enough to 
make best use of nutrients and avoid 
pollution of ground and surface water. 
Laborers on some large farms are 
poorly paid, poorly housed, and poorly 
treated. They do not display the pride of 
ownership and operation enjoyed by a 
successful farm owner-operator. They 
may be foreign-born workers 
unappreciated in a community 
committed to retaining its heritage. On 
the other hand, it is arrogant to presume 
that every adult on farms has the 
management and other skills necessary 
to be a successful family farm operator. 
Sub-therapeutic use of antibiotics 
is useful for controlling disease in large, 
confinement livestock operations. 
Resistance to antibiotics developed by 
organisms in livestock may attend those 
organisms passed to humans. 
Problems of odor, waste disposal, 
and family farm preservation noted 
above sometimes are what economists 
call negative externalities not entering 
the financial accounting of market 
participants and, hence, not guided by 
the market. Efficient production for the 
good of the nation, however, requires 
that externalities be internalized, that is, 
that farms either pay compensation for 
or control odors, water quality 
degradation, and soil erosion damaging 
others. Sometimes the best solution is to 
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locate in a region where these negative 
externalities either are not a problem 
(e.g. odors in the sparsely populated 
Great Plains) or are not viewed as a 
problem (in some farming areas manure 
smells like money, not waste). 
However, the few experts I have 
consulted contend that large farms will 
produce more cheaply than small farms 
even when all environmental costs are 
accounted for. And markets have indeed 
passed lower farm food ingredient cost-
saving to consumers. 
If costs are lower on large farms 
even when social costs are included, 
simply requiring large farms to pay all 
costs will not stop the industrialization 
of agriculture. Are stronger measures 
needed? It is for the political process 
rather than for economists to answer that 
question. If asked to choose, economists 
have no objective means to decide 
whether lower food costs or more 
traditional family farms are best for 
society. 
Social and economic vitality of 
rural communities is usually best served 
by family farms with middle class 
operator-families and lots of value-
adding livestock to multiply crop 
returns. The Midwest once was both the 
nation's feed basket and its livestock 
basket. However, traditional family 
farms in the great Midwest feed basket 
have been shedding livestock at a rapid 
rate. The Midwest is unlikely to see that 
livestock production return from the 
South and West except as large, 
integrated operations. Thus, Midwest 
communities face a dilemma: the only 
thing worse than relying on an economic 
base of large, integrated livestock farms 
may be to have no local livestock farms 
at all. 
The political issue whether 
society is best served by vertical 
coordination and factory farms first 
needs to be addressed at the national 
level. Deciding the issue state by state 
will merely drive industrial farming to 
the states that allow it. Industrial farms 
excluded from state X will go to state Y 
where they, along with other large-scale 
farms, will drive down nationwide 
prices-including prices in state X. This 
denies to family farms in state X the 
benefit of survival afforded by 
contracting with an integrator to produce 
broilers or hogs essential to preserve 
their "family farms." Problems of 
defining what is an acceptable and 
unacceptable farm and then 
administering and enforcing the concept 
seems so huge then national legislation 
is likely to arrive slowly, if at all. Some 
environmental standards need to be set 
nationally to avoid any "race for the 
bottom" as states compete for economic 
activity by lowering standards. Rules 
need to be tailored to circumstances, 
however, because environmental 
problems differ among soils, climate, 
typography, and population density. 
Assuming industrial farms are 
deemed acceptable and environmental 
regulation is formulated at the national 
level, then each local township or county 
can be free to decide whether to allow 
such farms. Densely populated areas 
would mostly reject such farms. 
Receptive counties would compete for 
the employment and income benefits of 
additional value-added agricultural 
enterprises in their community. The cost 
of a positive decision will become less 
as technology improves to reduce 
livestock waste odors and lagoon 
failures. 
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Questioning the System 
The foregoing discussion begs 
more fundamental questions of whether 
there is a better way to organize the 
economy to avoid structural adjustment 
trauma. Perhaps the most basic decision 
of any society is how best to meet the 
needs of its people. Americans 
overwhelmingly choose democracy. 
They also choose markets-two-thirds 
of the economy relies mostly on markets 
to determine when, what, how, and 
where to produce. 
The choice of democracy is non-
controversial. The choice of the market 
also is not very controversial following 
~e spectacular failure of socialism in the 
former East Block and North Korea 
contrasted with the spectacular success 
of market economies from East Asia to 
Chile. The Great Depression removed 
the case for laissez faire (markets only); 
the fall of socialist economies worldwide 
removed the case for government only. 
So most Americans are 
committed to democratic-capitalism. 
"The devil is in the details," however-
in the many difficult choices and 
compromises between markets and 
government. Where in specific 
situations should control rest-with the 
market or with the public sector? Or as 
the widely popular Cooperative 
Extension Service series posed the issue 
some years back: "Who will control 
agriculture?" How free should markets 
be and how high and wide should the 
public safety net be? 
What Economics Says 
Choosing a System 
The choice of political-economic 
system is ultimately political, but 
economics has much to offer. It begins 
with the proposition that people seek 
economic efficiency, equity, and 
freedom. Other goals could be specified 
such as international competitiveness, 
growth, and environmental protection, 
but these will be served by efficiency: a 
system allocating resources, including 
savings and investment, to where social 
(not just private!) returns are highest in a 
competitive economy will be 
economically efficient, will grow at an 
appropriate rate, and will be 
environmentally sound. 
Justice or fairness is part of 
equity and also is ultimately a political 
decision. Economists have shown, 
however, that poor people derive much 
more satisfaction from another dollar of 
income than do rich people (Blue and 
Tweeten). Economists also show that 
societies such as Sweden emphasizing 
equity through the social welfare state 
sacrifice economic growth (Crook, p. 
12). Numerous welfare states in western 
Europe have democratically chosen a 
high safety net at a cost of high 
unemployment, slow employment and 
economic growth, and risk of global 
economic and technological 
marginalization. Thus, although 
economics does not specify the proper 
size of a safety net to promote equity, a 
higher safety net tends to go with slower 
economic growth. 
Pursuing Efficiency 
Economic theory and practice 
provide compelling evidence that the 
market provides unparalleled efficiency 
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for so-called market goods defined as 
goods that are rival, exclusionary, and 
transparent. So-called public goods lack 
these characteristics. A underutilized 
bridge is a public good because it costs 
nothing for another auto to use it-
hence discouraging use by charging a fee 
unwisely diminishes costless use. A 
nonexclusionary good must be provided 
by the public because a private firm 
producing it will not be able to exclude 
free-loaders. The private firm will not 
cover costs necessary to produce the 
good. In the case of a nontransparent 
good, consumers do not know what they 
are buying and, hence, do not know how 
much to acquire or how much to pay a 
p9vate supplier. 
For these reasons, the market 
alone does not supply enough market 
information, basic research, 
environmental protection, and product 
quality identification in agriculture. A 
public role is appropriate to supply or 
coordinate these functions. The 
important point, however, is that 
agricultural commodities are market 
goods, not public goods, which markets 
allocate with maximum efficiency. 
Markets for sugar, tobacco, peanuts, and 
dairy products work. Continued 
government intervention in the markets 
have no more justification than in grain 
markets, although adjustment pains to 
markets may be more severe due to 
severe existing market distortions. The 
argument in the case of tobacco is not 
that the market prices should be lower 
(perhaps they should be higher to 
discourage smoking), but that the tax on 
tobacco customers accrue to the health 
industry rather than to tobacco quota 
holders. 
The impersonal nature of the 
market is both its strength and weakness. 
An efficient market favors or culls 
producers based on their ability to turn a 
profit rather than on their lineage or 
political connections. The agony and 
ecstasy that results is a form of social 
Darwinism called creative destruction 
by Joseph Schumpeter. An economy 
progresses through a relentless dynamic 
of punishing laggards and rewarding 
ingenuity. No substitute has been found 
for this process creating the highest 
living standards in the world. 
Neoclassical economics reduces 
to the simple proposition that an action 
is warranted if benefits exceed costs. 
Because people tend to be rational in 
making decisions on that same basis, 
neoclassical economics is both an 
ideological framework and a good 
predictor of behavior. Neoclassical 
economics is favored by economists not 
just because it is an elegant model, but 
because it both explains and predicts 
well. It works! 
The most important development 
in the field of economics during my 
carer is the triumph of the standard 
model (Tweeten 1997). Any country 
following that economic policy model 
emphasizing private enterprise but with a 
lean and effective public sector doing a 
few things well can be food secure and 
economically comfortable if not rich. 
That standard model emphasizing mostly 
markets, but also a lean, effective 
government providing public goods and 
correcting externalities has been 
criticized as providing food for profit 
and not for people. Those · who favor 
providing food for people, not for profit, 
can learn from China. By shifting from 
the system of food for people (People's 
Republic) to food for profit after 1978, 
perhaps 100 million people have been 
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brought out of poverty and food 
insecurity. 
Populist groups have perennially 
been highly critical of American 
agribusiness firms such as Cargill and 
Monsanto specifically, and of grain, 
banking, and futures markets generally. 
After reviewing a substantial number of 
studies of the conduct and performance 
of American agribusiness, I find no 
foundation in fact for charges that 
farmers are systematically exploited by 
the agribusiness sector (Tweeten 1989, 
Ch. 8). Of course, there are exceptions. 
But American agribusiness is the most 
innovative and efficient in the world. 
Cooperatives help to keep private firms 
honest. Producers would not continue to 
deliver products to markets that 
underpay them year after year. Neither 
low income/wealth nor low rates of 
return indicate that farmers are exploited 
by the agribusiness sector.2 
Ironically, a major cause of 
structural adjustment pain in farming 
arises because agribusiness performs 
"too well." The continuing stream of 
new labor-saving and cost-reducing 
inputs made available to producers 
2Farms with crop and livestock sales of $50,000 
or more in 1996, account for nearly 90 percent 
of farm receipts and rely mainly on farm income. 
They averaged $74,519 of income per household 
in 1996, 58 percent more than the average U.S. 
household (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
December 1998, p. 17). Farm households with 
less than $50,000 of crop and livestock sales and 
which account for about 70 percent of all farm 
households lost on average $2,737 from their 
farming operation in 1996, but averaged $45,418 
of income from off-farm sources. If farm losses 
are excluded, their incomes averaged near that of 
nonfarm households. Most were part-time and/or 
hobby farmers. They cannot expect "parity" 
farm income from a part-time operation, but can 
expect to subsidize an uneconomic size farming 
operation from their off-farm income. 
places continuing and often painful 
pressure on producers to adjust. 
In a recent article (1997), I and 
Carl Zulauf note that American 
agriculture is under a new public policy 
paradigm recognizing the industry's 
proclivity for long-term economic 
equilibrium, innovation, and 
competitiveness. The industry is 
distancing itself from the old 
anachronistic paradigm of chronic 
economic disequilibrium, excess 
production capacity, low income, and 
low returns on resources. Proximate 
forces behind the 1996 farm bill were a 
Republican Congress, budget stringency, 
and a strong export market. But the root 
cause of the 1996 farm bill was the new 
paradigm, hence the nation is unlikely to 
return to government stock 
accumulation, land set-asides, and 
supply management at variance with the 
standard model. 
Serving Equity 
I noted earlier that farm 
commodities are not public goods, but 
rather are market goods allocated most 
efficiently by markets. To be sure, 
major government programs have 
supported farm commodity prices since 
1933, but at a cost (lost national income) 
of $5 billion or more per year in the 
1950s, 1960s, and early 1980s (see 
Tweeten 1989, Ch. 10). Such 
intervention led humorist P. J. O'Rourke 
to jest that three bastions of Marxism 
remam: North Korea, Cuba, and 
American agriculture. Thus, 
government interventions to idle 
cropland, accumulate storage stocks, and 
support farm prices must be justified on 
equity rather than efficiency grounds. 
Commodity programs are 
difficult to defend on equity grounds or 
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to save the family farm. The net worth 
of commercial farm families (crop and 
livestock sales over $100,000 per year or 
more) who receive the lion's share of 
program benefits averages nearly $1 
million, or several times that of the 
average taxpayer or consumer paying for 
programs. 
Evaluating the worth of family 
farms by efficiency alone can miss the 
point, however. For example, 
economists might note that the Liberty 
Bell is worth $2 for scrap bronze, yet the 
public has justifiably spent millions of 
dollars to preserve and display it because 
it is considered to be an essential part of 
our heritage. 
.. In 1985, a random poll of 
American adults found that 82 percent 
agreed with the statement that "the 
family farm must be preserved because it 
is an essential part of our heritage" 
(Jordan and Tweeten). Presumably, 
Americans want to preserve family 
farms because they are unique. A recent 
study by Drury and Tweeten indicates 
that farmers are indeed unique. For 
example, farmers are more frequent 
churchgoers, and have much lower crime 
rates and divorce rates than people in 
other occupations and places of 
residence. 
Where does this argument for 
preserving family farms as a vital part of 
our heritage break down? The answer is 
that commodity programs have not 
saved family farms despite $363 billion 
spent by taxpayers from 1933 to 1997 on 
such programs, plus another $20 billion 
of losses on loans by the Farmer's Home 
Administration (now part of the Farm 
Service Agency).3 
Statistical evidence indicates that 
federal assistance saved many family 
farms in the short run during the 
financial crisis of the early 1980s. But 
in the long run the capital, security, and 
acreage diversion provided by programs 
actually speeded trends towards fewer 
and larger farms (Tweeten 1993). 
Because support of commercial farms 
receiving the vast majority of program 
benefits is essential for political viability 
of commodity programs, efforts are 
probably futile in Congress to realign 
programs to serve small farmers. Also, 
difficult political and administrative 
issues arise in targeting benefits-issues 
such as what is a small farm or a family 
farm. 
Poverty is rare indeed among 
commercial farm operators. Reform of 
government programs to address 
problems of low income in farming 
would need to emphasize not commodity 
programs, but human resource 
development for poor families of hired 
workers and operators of small farms. 
The nation will continue to lose 
noncommercial farms at the rate of 2 
percent annually, but commercial farm 
numbers will not change much. Does 
the nation need to try to stop change to 
reduce psychic adjustment costs? 
Leaving a farm in mid-career can be 
more traumatic than leaving other 
employment because the farm is a way 
of life and home as well as a job. 
Nonetheless, leavers appear to make 
favorable adjustments. A 1987 survey in 
Oklahoma of 295 mid-career farm 
3 In 1997 constant dollars, taxpayers spent $533 
billion from 1965 to 1997 alone for farm income 
stabilization. 
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leavers found that those who felt they 
were somewhat or much better off 
outnumbered those who said they were 
somewhat or much worse off by a ratio 
of 3 to 1 (Perry et al., p. 55). Two-thirds 
of the 624 former farmers in North 
Dakota surveyed in 1986 said they were 
better off since they quit farming 
(Bentley et al., p. 11 ). 
An efficient, dynamic economy 
can also be a caring society. I have 
contended for decades that greater 
provision should be made for those left 
behind by technology and change. The 
public and private sectors could support 
more personal and financial counseling, 
job information and training, and 
moving assistance to ease adjustments 
for people who leave farming in mid-
career. The national dividend from 
greater productivity in agriculture dwarfs 
the value of resources needed to help 
those left behind. 
In 1996 (the last year available) 
farm operator household income 
averaged $50,361 or 7 percent more than 
that of the average U.S. household (U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, December 
1997, p. 17). Average household income 
was similar by type of farm: for cash 
grain; "other crops;" beef, hog, or sheep; 
dairy, and "other livestock" farms. 
Whereas these data indicate that 
the farming industry is near economic 
equilibrium after lagging behind income 
of nonfarmers for many decades, data 
also point to a disturbing equity issue: 
household income of operators with less 
than a high school education averaged 
less than half ($30,173 versus $63,075) 
that of households with college educated 
operators in 1995 (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, June 1997, p. 14 ). Those 
numbers point to a broader and more 
serious national equity problem: the 
growing disparity between the income of 
the lower and upper half of the 
population. The lower half of the divide, 
mainly those with less than a college 
education, are disproportionately 
represented in the nation's pathologies: 
single parenting, school dropouts, drugs, 
crime-and is creating another 
generation with the same attributes. 
Recognizing that farmers derive 90 
percent of their household income from 
off-farm sources, the solution to the 
widening income distribution on farms 
and in society must be found mostly in 
off-farm employment. 
Of that portion of income 
inequality that could be explained by 
William Cline of the Institute of 
International Finance, 60 percent was 
accounted for by technology, 16 percent 
by trade, and the remaining 24 percent 
was due to lower minimum wages, less 
union strength, and more immigration 
(see Davis, p. A2). A major cause of the 
widening income distribution is 
technology-society rewards those best 
able to create, operate, and manage high 
technology and pop culture in which this 
nation excels. The one-sixth of the 
problem attributed to freer trade arises 
because markets reward the Bill Gates 
and Michael Jacksons who excel in the 
high-tech industries and pop culture 
exported to the world. Initially at least, 
trade worsens the situation for unskilled 
operatives in textile mills and shoe 
factories competing with third-world 
labor. Similar reasoning could be 
applied to commercial versus 
noncommercial farms. 
The answer to this massive 
problem is not to bind technology 
(Ludditism) or to restrain trade (autarky) 
any more than the answer to getting too 
small a piece of pie is to bake a smaller 
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pie. The answer is to increase the 
economic pie through efficiency gains, 
but invest more in better schools (school 
choice, longer school terms, etc.), 
vocational-technical training, and other 
measures to improve human resources. 
The answer also is to use the great 
efficiency gains from improved 
technology and free trade to supplement 
wages of low income workers. I have 
proposed a wage supplement paying 
(say) 60 percent of the shortfall of a 
worker's actual wage below a target 
wage. If the target wage is $12 per hour 
and a worker is worth only $2 per hour 
to an employer, the wage supplement 
would be $6 [0.6(12-2)] per hour. 
Hence, total earnings would be $8 per 
hour which at 2,000 hours per year 
would reach the poverty threshold of 
$16,000 for a family of four. That plan 
would encourage those with marginal 
skills to work, encourage employers to 
hire them, and could be consistent with 
greater employment and the work ethic 
necessary to reduce the pathology of 
despair noted earlier among the 
underclass. The Earned Income Tax 
Credit could be retained for those such 
as farm operators who are self-
employed. 
Other Goals 
Well-being of people is more 
than about economic efficiency and 
equity discussed in the foregoing 
paragraphs. Well-being also is about 
freedom and democracy, but only market 
economies have enjoyed freedom and 
democracy. No socialist economy has 
also been a democracy. Critics might 
note that one sector such as the dairy 
industry can be centrally planned with 
incomes guaranteed by subsidies from 
consumers or taxpayers in a rich market 
economy such as ours. However, such 
an exception for dairy is not a good 
example for how to run an economy. 
To be sure, a public role is 
essential to protect the environment and 
to provide for infrastructure and services 
such as education, research, information 
systems, and food safety. But provision 
of these public goods requires resources 
including competent civil servants-
resources affordable thus far only in 
capitalist societies. Socialist economies 
not only have trouble feeding 
themselves, they also have failed to 
protect their environment. Economic 
growth that attends market economies 
under the standard model causes nations 
to move through the demographic 
transition from high to eventually low 
birth, death, and population growth rates 
essential for the planet to live within its 
environmental and natural resource 
carrying capacity. 
Little has been said of stability in 
agriculture. The market provides for 
stability through private storage stocks, 
forward markets (futures, options), 
insurance, and other means. Farmers are 
no longer welfare cases-they can afford 
to pay for risk management tools. The 
fact that private buffer stock holders 
have higher discount rates and, hence, 
higher costs of storing commodities than 
does the public, may lead some to 
conclude that this externality justifies 
public stabilization of food supplies and 
prices. 
More than this externality must 
be shown to justify government 
involvement in stabilizing food supplies 
and prices. The second requirement is a 
positive answer to the question: Is the 
cost of government market intervention 
(bungling, waste, mismanagement) less 
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than the social loss from the market 
failure? Judging by past government 
buffer stock management, the answer to 
that question is "no" (see Gunasekera 
and Fisher; McClatchy et al.). It also is 
difficult to justify government provision 
of crop insurance because subsidies 
encourage undesirable variation in 
production, and the farming of high-risk, 
environmentally sensitive land. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Farmers are feeling the impact of 
a new wave of industrialization in 
agriculture. Adjustments are often 
painful and the public sector could do 
niore to ease the transition of displaced 
persons to alternative employment. 
Examples are personal and financial 
counseling, job information and training, 
and moving assistance. However, data 
indicate that most of those who leave 
farming in mid-career make successful 
adjustments to alternative employment 
and residence. 
At issue is whether to stop the 
industrialization of agriculture. It would 
certainly be difficult, if not impossible, 
to halt factory farming and vertical 
coordination. But, the decision to stop 
or slow industrialization is for the 
political process and is not for 
economists. Economists can point out 
the cost in lost family farms of 
continuing industrialization. But they 
also can point out that industrialization 
brings lower food cost-likely even if 
firms are regulated to internalize their 
externalities as seems appropriate. The 
decision by one state to reject 
industrialization will only shift 
industrialization to other states and 
deprive local farmers and communities 
• 
of an emerging economic base. Many 
integrated poultry growers and hog 
producers, for example, view integration 
as essential to preserve their family 
farms and way of life. Local areas could 
have greater say in whether they wish to 
allow factory farms, however. 
So what does industrialization 
offer farm people? The answer is that 
industrialization of agriculture (with 
proper environmental protection) brings 
efficiency gains that raise living 
standards of farm and nonfarm people 
alike, given time for resource 
adjustments. Farm people have a major 
stake in maintaining a dynamic, flexible, 
creative economy that rewards savings, 
investment, and efficiency. Such an 
economy supplies resources to address 
environmental and social problems, 
including attention to those left behind 
by economic development. A useful 
policy framework is to internalize 
externalities (odors, lagoon spills, water 
contamination from nitrogen and 
phosphate, etc.) using penalties, 
subsidies, and technical assistance-then 
let markets work without special favors 
for small or large farms. 
This paper raises the broader 
issue of whether America is operating 
under the proper democratic-capitalistic 
system if that system has not retained a 
longer number of family farms and has 
permitted the industrialization of 
agriculture. While "the system" has 
numerous flaws, it also has great 
strengths. The conclusion (paraphrasing 
Winston Churchill) is that democratic-
capitalism is the worst system-except 
for all the rest. I enumerated several 
proposals to improve the system, but 
great care must be taken to avoid well-
intentioned reforms that when applied 
are counter productive. 
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